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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

:

v.

:

THOMAS GENE DAVIS,

:

Case No. 870221-CA

:

Category No.2

Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This
against

case

Thomas

is

Eugene

an

appeal

Davis

from

denying

an order

and judgment

Appellant's

Motion

to

Compel the Return of Property seized from him at the time of
his arrest.

Charges against appellant were dismissed; however,

on May 12, 1987, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, Judge, Third
Judicial Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
entered his order refusing to require the State to return the
property to Mr. Davis.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On October 30, 1984, $277.38 was seized from the person
of

Appellant

Davis

incident

to

his

arrest

after

an

investigation which is reflected in Findings of Fact numbered 1
through 8.
Davis'

See Findings, Conclusions and Order on Defendant

Motion

to

Compel

Return

of

Property

(R-121-135

at

122-123).
After the case was dismissed as to Davis, he immediately
requested that the money seized from him be returned to him.

See Finding No. 10 (R-124).

The prosecutor promptly made a

determination that the money seized from Davis was no longer
••needed as evidence" within the meaning of Section 77-24-2, and
he notified Davis* attorney that he was prepared to authorize a
return

of

the

property

to Davis

"upon

proof

satisfactory to the prosecuting attorney."

of

ownership

See Finding No. 11

(R-124).
After

Davis

failed

to

provide

proof

of

ownership

satisfactory to the prosecuting attorney, Davis filed a motion
to compel the return of the property which was denied after
hearing.

See Findings Nos. 13 and 14 (R-124-125).

In

its

Memorandum

proceeding

ancillary

appropriate

forum

but

to

Opinion
a

that

the

criminal
Davis*

court

held

prosecution

refusal

to

that
was

respond

a
the
to

specific inquiry by the prosecutor regarding his ownership and
the lawfulness of his possession of the property precluded the
relief

that

he

sought.

See

Finding

No.

15

(R-125)

and

Memorandum Decision (R-84-87).
At the court•s suggestion, further proceedings were held
in which Davis testified before the prosecutor under oath and
provided
money.

detail

regarding where he had obtained most of the

See Findings Nos. 16 and 17 (R-125).

After the further proceeding and after investigation, the
prosecutor again declined to return the property to Davis.
Davis filed a Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing, which
was held on August 20, 1986 and at which the prosecutor and the
detective who investigated the allegations by Davis, testified
regarding th€* evidence and information which they had which

- 2 -

showed that the money was likely part of the proceeds from the
crime with which

Davis

Findings 18-20 (R-126).

had

been

charged

as

a party.

See

Based on the re|cord before it and the

testimony adduced at the hearing on the Motion for Evidentiary
Hearing, the court concluded that Davis had failed to meet his
burden of proof that the prosecutor had abused his discretion.
See Conclusions 1-3 (R-127).

Davis brings this appeal from the

Order entered based on those Findings and Conclusions.

ARGUMENT

POINT I. EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN
DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE METHOD OF HANDLING THE
PROCEDURE DETAILED IN 77-24-2 UTAH CODE ANN. (1953
AS AMENDED) IS ONE ANCILLARY TO TH]E CRIMINAL TRIAL,
THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS THE SAME AS THAT REQUIRED IN
A CIVIL RATHER THAN A CRIMINAL CASE,.
After examination of Section 77-24-*2 Utah Code Annotated,
(1953

as

amended)

the

trial

court

determined

that

it had

jurisdiction to review the prosecutor's decision not to return
the seized property in a proceeding ancillary to the criminal
case.

In its Memorandum Decision, th^ trial

court

further

stated that it did not feel restricted to compel appellant to
bring a civil action to recover his funds.
court

However, the trial

also stated that the statute doles provide the County

Attorney with the discretion and authority necessary to make
reasonable

inquiry

into whether

possess" the property.

the defendant may

"lawfully

Further, if appelllant is not satisfied

- 3 -

with the decision of the prosecutor, he may seek further review
by the trial court in an appropriate evidentiary hearing.
Appellant argues that due to the statute's being placed
in the criminal code, it is inherently criminal

in nature.

This argument ignores the unique nature of Section 77-24-2.
That section specifically details a procedure to be followed in
disposing of property seized but no longer needed as evidence
in criminal trials.

The language is as follows:

Upon proof of ownership and of lawfulness of
possession
satisfactory
to
the
prosecuting
attorney, the prosecuting attorney shall give the
owner written authorization which shall entitle the
owner to receive the property from the person
having custody of it. Section 77-24-2 Utah Code
Ann. (1953 as amended).
It is clear by the enactment of this statute that the
legislature

intended

the prosecutor

to

be

charged

with

the

administrative responsibility to make this determination.

By

using the language "upon proof of ownership and lawfulness of
possession," the legislature intended the burden of proof to be
on the claimant to the property.
to

the

satisfaction

of

the

Further, that such proof be

prosecutor.

This

burden

more

closely resembles a civil proceeding rather than the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard required in criminal cases.
Whether the trial court's determination

that a hearing

ancillary to the criminal case is the proper forum is correct
or not, the result is the same since the burden and standard of
proof would be the same in either event.
Appellant further argues that the trial court erred by
failing to order the preparation of a transcript.

- 4 -

To support

this position appellant cites to Utah Code Annotated, Section
77-3-1 (1953 as amended), which grants defendants the right to
appeal after conviction, and Section 77-32-5 (1953 as amended),
which requires the county to carry the costs of preparation of
transcripts

for

this

first

argument misses the mark.

proceeding

nature*

under

right.

Again

We are not dealing with

appeal of right in this case.
the

o£

appeal

this

a first

Furthermote, as has been shown,

Section

77-24-2

is

not

criminal

in

Therefore, it more closely resembles forfeiture cases

where the proceedings are considered civil rather than criminal
in nature.

This principle was considered in Resek v State, 706

P.2d 288 (Alaska 1985) where the Alaska Supreme Court stated,
M

An

in

rem

proceeding

for

forfeiture

of

various

types of

property used or intended for use in connection with a felony
violation of state drug laws is intended as a civil, not a
criminal, sanction and, hence is not a "criminal prosecution"
within

provision

of

Constitution

[Const.

Art.l

sec.11

]

affording an accused a right in all criminal prosecutions to
appointed counsel at public expense." 706 P.2d at p.293.
Therefore,
proceeding

is

appellant's
criminal

argument

in nature

he

that
should

since
be

this

afforded a

prepared transcript and not required to go forward with proof
of

lawful

ownership

fails

to

take

into

consideration

the

language of Section 77-24-2. Here we are dealing with a unique
statute

that

specifically

outlines

a

procedure

whereby

appellant need only demonstrate, to the satisfaction
prosecutor,
Appellant

that

the

monies

were

not

unlawfully

failed to convince the prosecutor

- 5 -

that

of the

obtained.
the monies

were lawfully obtained and on review the trial court upheld the
decision of the prosecutor.

Those determinations were made in

accordance with the procedures specifically detailed in Section
77-24-2 and should be affirmed.

POINT II.
A*

DUE PROCESS WAS SATISFIED IN THIS CASE

Appellant was given the opportunity for a
hearing and a forum for review was made
available.

The Utah Supreme Court has stated, "implicit in the due
process clause of our state constitution is that persons be
afforded a hearing to determine their rights under the law."
Gribble v Gribble, 583 P.2d

64

(Utah 1978).

In this case,

Section 77-24-2 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), provides for
such a hearing.
Appellant
1980),

and

demonstrate
process.

cites Hulbert

In
what

re

Boyer,

v State,

636

is required

P.2d

for

607

P.2d

1085

(Utah

a statute

to

1217

(Utah

1981),
satisfy

to
due

A close examination of those cases reveals that due

process was satisfied in this case.
In In re Boyer, infra, the Utah Supreme Court clearly
defined

what

is

required

to

meet

due

process

safeguards.

First, the statute must clearly define the scope of permissible
conduct. Xd
statute

at

directs

evidence

1087.
the

sufficient

Section 77-24-2 does
prosecutor
to

to

establish

just

investigate
"proof

of

that.

The

and/or

take

ownership

and

lawfulness of possession to the satisfaction of the prosecuting
attorney."

Upon presentation of such proof, the prosecutor is

- 6 -

required to
entitle

H

the

give the owner written authorization which shall
owner

to

receive

the

property

from the person

having custody of it."
The

court

further

stated

in Boyter,

"A

statute which

effects fundamental liberties is unconstitutional if it is so
vague that men of common intelligence mu$t necessarily guess at
its meaning...H citing to State v Packard. 122 Ut. 369, 374,
250

P.2d

561,

563

(Utah

1853).

Here

appellant

was

given

detailed instruction concerning how he might obtain the return
of what he alleged was his lawful property.

The statute is

more than clear on the procedures to follow to obtain that end.

B.

There is no necessity under Section 77-24-2
UCA (1953 as amended) for determination by a
neutral party as long as jhe prosecutor's
decision is subject to review.

Appellant's

argument

that

in Section 77-24-2 cases the

prosecutor is not a neutral and detached magistrate, is not on
point.

As the state has demonstrated, this proceeding is not

"criminal in nature" and therefore well

settled

law dealing

with search warrants, i.e. Coolidae v pjew Hampshire, 403 US
443, 29 LEd 2d 564 (1971), has no application to this case.
The state has further demonstrated that appellant's burden of
proof is civil rather than criminal in nature, under Section
77-24-2,

and

as a result, due process concerns are somewhat

lessened.
The notion that differing standards of due process are
applied in various types of proceedings is firmly entrenched in
our jurisprudence.

In One Lot Emerald (Jut Stones v U.S., 409

- 7 -

U.S. 232, 93 S.Ct 489 (1971), the United States Supreme Court
held/

"A civil forfeiture

earlier

acquittal

of

differences

in

burdens

proof."

of

the

proceeding

criminal

types

of

In

this

was

not

charges

sanctions
case

barred

because

imposed

appellant

and

should

by an
of
in

the
the

not be

allowed to argue that the dismissal of his criminal charges
necessarily requires the return of the seized property in issue.
Appellant's

argument

that, under

Section

77-24-2, the

prosecutor possesses unfettered discretion that is incompatible
with due process is without merit.
court

retain

jurisdiction

to

Not only did the trial

review

the

decision

of

the

prosecutor, such an evidentiary hearing was held in this case.
Moreover,

appellate

review

of

the

trial

court's

determination, concerning the decision of the prosecutor, is
available to the appellant.

Due process

is, and has been,

afforded to appellant by the laws of this state.

POINT III. APPELLANT FAILED TO MEET THE BURDEN OF
PROOF NECESSARY UNDER SECTION 77-24-2, UTAH CODE
ANN. (1953 AS AMENDED).
On August 20, 1986, Judge

Hansen

held

an

evidentiary

hearing to determine if the prosecutor abused his discretion in
refusing to return the property seized from the appellant at
the

time

presented

of

his

a

sworn

arrest.

On

affidavit

ownership of the property.

February
to

the

10, 1986, Appellant
court

declaring

his

Appellant and his attorney met with

the prosecutor on June 19, 1986, and the appellant testified,
under

oath, concerning

how

he

came

- 8 -

into possession of the

property.

Appellant was unable to account for how he came into

possession of all the monies when he w^s questioned at that
time.

As

a

result/

the

prosecutor

was not

satisfied that

appellant was the lawful owner of the inoney, as required by
Section 77-24-2.
Appellant cites Campbell v Cochrar^, 416 A.2d 211 (Del.
Super. 1980)# and argues that under its holding the prosecutor
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the money was
stolen or otherwise unlawfully obtained.
the

real

issue.

demonstrated/

it

Under
is

the

Section

appellant

offered

testimony.

was

Therefore,

77-24-2/

appellant/

carries the burden of showing
a
the

not

lawful

sworn

This argument avoids
as

has

been

the prosecutor/ who

ownership.

affidavit

prosecutor

Here, all

and

acted

unsupported
within

his

discretion in denying return of the property to the appellant.
At the evidentiary hearing held on August 20/ 1986, the
appellant

called

the prosecutor

to testify.

The prosecutor

testified at length regarding the basis upon which he concluded
that

appellant

had

failed

to

prove,

to

the

prosecutor's

satisfaction, that appellant was the owner of the property.
See Findings of Fact numbered

19 and 20 (R-126) .

The trial

court heard the arguments of both sides and determined that the
prosecutor

had

not

abused

his

discretion

in

appellant can make no stronger showing that

any way.

If

the property is

lawfully his than a conclusory statement jthat he is the owner,
backed by unsupported testimony of odd jobs, he has failed to
meet

his

weighed

burden
against

of
the

proof,

particularly

other

information

when

his

available

proof

is

to

the

prosecutor showing that the property may h^ve been stolen.

POINT IV, SECTION 77-24-2 DOES NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY SHIFT THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE APPELLANT.
Appellant's
operated

to

final

argument

unconstitutionally

is

shift

that
the

Section
burden

thereby denying him due process protections.

77-24-2

of

proof,

Again appellant

relies on criminal cases to demonstrate that the burden of
proof remains on the prosecutor at all times.
607 P.2d

812 (Utah 1980); State v Rebeterano, 681 P.2d 1265

(Utah 1984) .

Again these cases do not address the real issue

in this case.
shift

Pierre v Morris,

from

Respondent

the

state

agrees

that

the

to the defendant

burden

does

not

as to proof of the

elements which establish the defendant's guilt.

However, the

defendant's guilt is not the issue in a hearing under Section
77-24-2.

Like other issues which may be raised ancillary to

the criminal

trial, a hearing under Section 77-24-2 has no

bearing

on

guilt.

Rather, the issue is whether a prosecutor abused his

discretion.

any

element

tending

to

establish

a

defendant's

The burden on that issue is properly upon the

party claiming that the prosecutor has abused his discretion.
The facts and issues in this case are remarkably similar
to

the

facts

and

issues

in State, Etc

Justice Court, 585 P.2d 1177 (Wash. 1978).

v Everett District
There the Supreme

Court of Washington, sitting en banc, held:
The superior court was correct in its conclusion
that the property in question should not be
returned to appellant. There is good reason to
believe the property may have been stolen, and the
doubts on this matter were not resolved by the
affidavit of the appellant's attorney. The rule
contemplated
that
the claimant, by his own
- 10 -

testimony or affidavits , will show the court
sufficient facts to convince it of his right to
possession. If such a showing is not made/ it is
the court's duty to deny the motijon...." 585 P.2d
at 1182.
Under Section 77-24-2, the prosecutor is given discretion
to refuse to return property seized

from an accused

if the

accused fails to prove ownership or lawfulness of possession
satisfactory to the prosecutor.

If the prosecutor abuses that

discretion, the court will reverse the prosecutor's decision
but the burden is properly upon the accused to prove that the
prosecutor abused his discretion.
The

state

has

repeatedly

demonstrated

that

Section

77-24-2 more closely resembles a civil proceeding and is not
criminal
dealing
One

in nature.
with

Lot

The closest

parallels

forfeiture proceedings

Emerald

Cut

Stones

v

are

those cases

after a criminal trial.

U.S.,

(infra).

In

another

forfeiture case the Colorado Supreme Court stated, "It is the
property owner's burden in a civil forfeiture proceeding to
show

that

possession

of

the

nuisance is not unlawful."

property

seized

as

People v I^ot 23, 735

a

public

P. 2d

184

(Colo. 1987).
Section 77-24-2 then does not unconstitutionally

shift

the burden of proof to the appellant.

CONCLUSION

In Section 77-24-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended),
Utah

has

adopted

a

unique

statute

which

details

specific

procedures to be followed in disposing of property seized but
no longer needed as evidence in criminal qases.

It is clear by the enactment of Section 77-24-2 that the
legislature

intended

the

prosecutor

to be charged with the

administrative responsibility to make a determination a) that
the

property

is no

longer needed

as evidence; b) that the

claimant is the owner; and c) that the claimant may lawfully
possess the property.
The trial court has determined that the proper forum for
review

of

the

decision

of

the

prosecutor,

under

Section

77-24-2, is in a proceeding ancillary to the actual criminal
trial.

Appellant sought and was granted such a review and the

trial court properly held that the prosecutor's determination
that appellant had not satisfactorily established his ownership
was not an abuse of his discretion in this case.

Therefore,

appellant was in no way denied due process in this case.
This
established

appeal

seeks

by

legislature

the

to

get

around

the

procedures

in the enactment

of Section

77-24-2.

Section 77-24-2 and due process have been accorded to

appellant

in this case, and the decision of the trial court

should be affirmed.

DATED this

//

day of February, 1988.

AMES F. HOUSLEY / /
feputy County Attorney

- 12 -

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JAMES F. HOUSLEY, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney,
hereby certify that eight

copies

of

the

foregoing

will be

delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 230 South 500 East,
Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and four
Elizabeth

Bowman,

Attorney

for

Defendant,

Salt

copies to
Lake

Legal

Defender Association, 333 South Second East, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111, this

DELIVERED

/rf

by

day of February, 1988.

/ \AJL^\ \O*^~

February, 1988.

- 13 -

^this

''

dav

of

ADDENDUM A

FILED !N CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah
<

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
By: JAMES F. HOUSLEY (Bar #1545)
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, 2nd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 3 63-7900

ft,

T

Jit

' ^ifJ:'jL

MAY 13 1987

H DirfogHtmSiey, Clerk 3ttLDisL,Court
- '

J

Dsptrfy Clerk'

IN THIS DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
: FINDINGS* CONCLUSIONS AND
ORDER ON DEFENDANT DAVIS' MOTION
TO COMPEL RETURN OF PROPERTY

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Case NO. CR 84-1483

V.

CINDY L. SLAGOWSKI,
GWENDOLON CARTER HALL,
THOMAS EUGENE DAVIS,
CARL LINDELL BARR and
LARRY DARWIN PERSON.

Hon. Jud^e Timothy R. Hansen

Defendants.
Defendant

Thomas

Eugene

Davis'

Motion

to

Compel

the

Return of Property, to-wit: $277.38 in cash seized from said
Davis at the time of his arrest, came on Regularly for hearing
on the 7th day of November, 1986, before the Honorable Philip
R.

Fishier,

Judge,

Defendant

Davis

being

present

and

represented by his Counsel, Jo Carol Nesset-Sale, and the State
being represented by Walter A. Ellett, Deputy Salt Lake County
Attorney, and the parties having presented their evidence and
arguments and the Court being fully advised^ enters its:
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FINDINGS
1.

That on October 30f 1984, at approximately 3:45 p.m.,

David Bascom, an investigator for the Utah Attorney General's
Office, personally
Turner,

hereafter

"Davis"),
Lindell

Larry

Barr

(hereafter

observed

Cindy Slagowski

"Turner"),
Darwin

Person

(hereafter

"Hall"),

Thomas

Davis

(hereafter

"Barr"),

conversing

Eugene

(true name Becky

and

with

"Person"),

Gwendolon
each

(hereafter

Carter

other

and

Carl
Hall
moving

around and about two motor vehicles parked in a parking lot at
715 West North Temple;
2.

That: said Bascom observed said Davis and said Turner

embracing and kissing and observed said Hall inside one of the
vehicles shuffling papers that appeared to be credit cards or
similar

documents, and

saw said

Hall hand some of the said

papers to said Turner; and
3.

That

said

Bascom

continued

to

observe

said

individuals and observed Turner enter one vehicle and drive to
First Interstate Bank, 1955 West North Temple, with the other
four individuals in the second car following;
4.

That at approximately 4:00 p.m. on said date, said

Turner cashed a forged check in the amount of $396.86 at said
bank, and received $396.86 in payment therefor, and that the
other four individuals remained outside in the second vehicle;
and
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5.

That said Bascom observed the first vehicle, being

driven by said Turner, drive out of the parking lot of said
bank and
second

travel
vehicle,

eastbound

on North Temple, followed

containing

the

other

four

by the

individuals,

following;
6.

That at approximately 4:15 p.m. on said date, said

Turner was arrested attempting to pass a second forged check
drawn on the same account at 710 South 200 West;
7.

That Davis, Person, Barr and C4rter were arrested a

few minutes later in the second motor vehicle at approximately
200 South 400 West and there were periods during those minutes
when the second motor vehicle was not under police surveillance;
8.

That a search of all five individuals and both motor

vehicles yielded no cash from either car; thirty-three cents in
the possession of Barr; $3.97 in the possession of Slagowski;
$11.95 in the possession of Carter; $151.09 in the possession
of Person; and $277.38 in the possession of Davis, for a total
of $444.62, which exceeded the amount received total by Turner
Of $396.86 by $46.76;
9.

That

all

five

individuals

were

arrested

and

prosecuted in a two-count Information, that Turner pled guilty,
and that on February 3, 1986, the case against the other four
individuals was dismissed pursuant to the State's motion, which
recited "that the witnesses who observed cfriminal activity are
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unable to make positive identification of said defendants, and
that the State would not be able to meet its burden of proof
with the evidence available at this time";
10.

That Davis immediately requested the return of the

money and no other person has made formal claim to the funds;
11.

That

consultation

the

with

the

prosecutor,
case

James

detective,

F.

Housley,

determined

after

that

the

$277.38 seized from Davis was no longer "needed as evidence"
within the meaning of §77-24-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, and
notified Defendant through his attorney that he was prepared to
authorize the return of said property to Davis upon "proof of
ownership satisfactory to the prosecuting attorney";
12.

That at a meeting held in the office of the Salt

Lake County Attorney on February 10, 1986, Davis presented a
pre-prepared affidavit which has been marked as Exhibit "A" and
attached

hereto

by

reference,

and

declined, upon advice of

Counsel, to be questioned under oath concerning the manner in
which he had

come

into possession of said money, and James

Housley, the prosecutor, refused to authorize the return of the
money to Davis, and that Davis did not sign a receipt prepared
by James F. Housley, attached hereto as Exhibit "B".
13.

That Counsel for Davis filed a Motion to Compel the

Return of the Property under the criminal heading and noticed
it up for hearing before the undersigned, to whom the criminal
case had been assigned;
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14.

That after argument

and submission of

memoranda

by

both parties on the issue of whether a proceeding ancillary to
the criminal case was a proper forumf
civil

proceeding,

to

determine

as opposed to a separate

whether

the

prosecutor

under

§77-24-2 had abused his discretion;
15.
photocopy

That

this

of which

Court

issued

is attached

a

Memorandum

Opinion,

a

hereto

as Exhibit

"C" and

by

reference made a part hereof;
16.
with

That

Housley

under

in

oath,

seized

from

on June 19, 1986, Davis
Housley"s

questions
him

at

office,

regarding

and

the

$nd

his

that

attorney met

Davis

soutces

of

the time of his arre$t.

answered,

the

$277.38

Davis' testimony

was that some of the funds were the result of auto detail work
for Steve Fisher at a Salt Lake auto paint shop, and that most
of it came through a business arrangement he had with one Mike
Garrity

wherein

they

would

sell

property

for

Jack

Bernel of

Peddler's Pawn Shop, Eighth South 200 West, at swap meets and
other

places

explained

that

and

receive

a

part

of

the

proceeds;

Davis

these two sources probably did not account for

all of the monies;
17.
was

not

That

Prosecutor

Housley

took

the

position

going to authorize the return of said

until forgery detective Jerry Campbell
his allegations respecting it;

that he

funds to Davis

coyld verify

or refute
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18.

That

Davis1

Counsel

filed

a

Motion

for

an

evidentiary hearing on July 15, 1986, which was scheduled for
hearing on August 20, 1986;
19.

That at the August 20th hearing. Prosecutor Housley

testified that he was not prepared to authorize the return of
the money to Davis for the following reasons:
a)
That Detective Campbell had not been
able to contact the persons mentioned by
Davis in the June 19 meeting, and could not
either confirm or refute what Davis had
stated at said meeting;
b)
That the facts reflected in Findings
numbered 1 through 8 above demonstrated to
Housley that it was very likely that in the
time between the receipt of the money by
Turner and the arrest of all parties it
would be extremely unlikely to dispose of
the money received by Turner; and
c) That Housley had been told by Counsel
for Person during plea negotiations that
Person and Barr had obtained the forged
checks, recruited Turner to cash them, had
given Turner half of the proceeds from the
one check that she successfully cashed, and
had not seen what Turner had done with her
half of the proceeds;
20.

That at said hearing. Detective Campbell testified

that he had made an effort a few days before the hearing to
contact the individuals named by Mr. Davis without success, and
that he had been unable to verify or refute Davis' statements;
21.

That a record of all proceedings in this Court on

Davis' Motion to Compel the Return of Property has been made by
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the Court Reporter, and that the cost of preparing a transcript
of

said

proceedings

would

be

far

in excess

of the amount of

money which is the subject of these proceedings.
CONCLUSIONS
1.

That

an ancillary

proceeding

in

the

above-entitled

criminal case is the appropriate forum fot determination under
§77-24-2,

Utah

Code

Annotated

prosecuting attorney has abused
authorize

the

return

of

1953,

whether

or

not

the

his discretion in declining to

property

no

lonaer

needed

in

the

prosecution of said criminal case to Davis;
2.

That the burden of establishing

that the prosecuting

attorney has thus abused his discretion i|s upon the claimant,
in this

case Davis, and

that

the

standatd

of

proof

is by a

preponderance of the evidence;
3.
of

the

That Davis has failed to establish by a preponderance
evidence

that

the

prosecuting

attorney

abused

his

discretion in this case; and
4.
determine
discretion
longer
Code

That

proceedings

whether

the

ancillary

prosecuting

to

a

criminal

attorney

has

case

abused

to
his

in declining to authorize the Return of property no

needed
Annotated

in a criminal
1953,

as

prosecution tinder

amended,

is

not

§77-24-2, Utah
the

kind

of

a

proceeding where the Court must or should require the State to
bear the cost of preparing a transcript of such proceedings.
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ORDER
Based on said Findings and Conclusions, and good cause
appearing therefor, it is hereby ORDERED:
1.

That Davis' Motion to Compel the Return of Property

be, and the same hereby is, denied; and
2.

That Davis' Motion to Compel the' State to Bear the

Cost of Transcribing the Record of these/ancillary proceedings
be, and the same hereby is, den]
DATED this

/<>? day of May(

Judge
**"' £"* "F"

ATTES

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

1

^fa&~-

e-aJbay

Attorney for Defendant, Davis
(Copy Received May JJ_, 1987)

J>y

4C&e*>rl./

Deplete*

A F F I D A V I T
STATE OF UTAH

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

: ss

)

I, Thomas E. Davis, am the lawful owner of the
$277.00 taken from me at the time of my arrest.
DATED this. _J>_~day

of February, 1986.

.

&

r£*.-L

THOMAS £. DAVI$

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this Jojjr

daay

of February, 1986.

My Commission Expires:

3-y7-gg

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake City, Utah

l

bj\M

-&4h&lT A.

RECEIPT

Received of

James

F.

Housley,

Deputy

Salt

Lake

County Attorney, $277.3-0 in currency seized by the Salt Lake
City Police Department in case # 84-96051,
I swear

that

I am

the

owner,

and

entitled

to

possession of said property.
Dated this /Cf

day of February, 1986.

I . 0< ^JLUAjTf~~c5^-^
Carol/ Nesset-Sale
(ttorney for Thomas Eugene Davis

_ _
Thomas Eugene Davis

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

day of

February, 1986.
My Commission Expires:

NOTARY PUBLIC residing
in Salt Lake County, Utah

00012C
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I N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD

l Dixon Hindtey, Clerk 3rd DisL Court
OTDICIAL DISTRICT

I N AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Oeputy Clerk

MEMORANDUM DECISION

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

CRH84-1483

vs.
CINDY L. SLAGOWSKI, GWENDOLYN
CARTER HALL, THOMAS EUGENE
DAVIS, CARL LINDELL BARR, and
LARRY DARWIN PERSON,
Defendants.

Before the Court is the defendant Davis1 Motion to Compel
the Return of Property.

The Court has heard argument on the

matter, and allowed the parties an opportunity to brief their
respective positions.

The Court has now received the briefs

from the parties, and has considered the oral argument, together
with the matters set forth in the Memorandums of law submitted,
and being otherwise fully advised, enters the following Memorandum
Decision.
In this case the defendant Davis seeks an Order from this
Court compelling the County Attorney's Office to return monies
in the amount of $277.43 that were apparently taken from Mr. Davis
at the time of his arrest. The case against «£. Davis was dismissed.
Mr. Davis claims that he is the lawful ow^er of the money, and
has done so by a brief Affidavit, dated February 6, 1986. The
County Attorney on behalf of the State of Utah takes the position
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:hat they are e n t i t l e d t o inquire further of Mr, Davis beyond
l i s Affidavit regarding his ownership of the funds in question,
and have refused t o return the above-mentioned monies to him.
The County A t t o r n e y ' s Office also takes the position that any
questions regarding the propriety or lack thereof of refusing
to return t h e funds t o Mr. Davis should be c i v i l in nature,
and t h i s Court does not have jurisdiction to resolve the matter
in the criminal f i l e .
The statute that the parties seek to have t h i s Court interpret
as to t h e i r respective positions i s Section 77-24-2 of the Utah
Code Ann., 1953 as amended, which provides in substance that
property which has been seized incident to an arrest, and which
i s no longer needed as evidence shall be returned to the owner
i f he may l a w f u l l y p o s s e s s i t .

That statutory provision i s

found in the Criminal Code promulgated by the legislature, and
t h i s Court determines that i t does have jurisdiction to review
t h e s e matters as a result of the criminal case f i l i n g , and i s
not r e s t r i c t e d t o compelling the defendant t o bring a c i v i l
a c t i o n t o recover h i s funds.

Therefore, in a proper case the

Court does and should exercise i t s jurisdiction, and order the
return of property seized at the arrest of a criminal defendant
when the State later dismisses the charges.
The Court determines, however, that i t i s not the purpose
of the s t a t u t e to place an absolute, non-reviewable discretion
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in the County Attorney's Office to determine whether or not
property seized at the time of arrest should be returned to
a criminal defendant.

The statute does, however, provide the

County Attorney with certain discretion ahd authority to make
reasonable inquiry, if not directly by inference, into whether
or not the defendant may

ff

lawfully possess it."

The Affidavit

submitted by defendant Davis is inadequate in that regard, and
his apparent refusal to comment further pursuant to the County
Attorney's questions as to his acquisition of those funds is
equally improper.

If the defendant Davi? feels that he can

make no stronger statement or explain further his claims to
possession of the funds other than the conclusory statement
that he is lawfully entitled to possess it, then the County
Attorney is entitled to withhold the funds.
Therefore the Court, based upon the state of the record
at the present time, denies the Motion t|o Compel the return
of the $277.43.. Should Mr. Davis be willing to answer reasonable
questions and other inquiry of the County Attorney's Office
regarding his lawful right to the funds, th^n he may be entitled
to receive those funds from the County Ajttorney.

This Court

is of the opinion, however, that should a dispute arise as to
whether or not a satisfactory explanation has bfcen made is reviewable
by this Court in an appropriate evidentiary hearing, if such
a request is made.
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The Salt Lake County Attorney's Office is directed to prepare
Order in accordance with this Memorandum Decision, and submit
le sane to the Court for review and signature in accordance
.th the Local Rules of Practice.
Dated this

f6

day of June, 1986.

J

TIMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the
following, this_

.day of June, 198 6:

Walter A. Ellett
James Housley
Attorneys for Plaintiff
231 East 400 South, Third Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Jo Carol Nesset-Sale
Attorney for Defendant
333 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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